Because Michigan requires a background check and a test to determine if you are knowledgable about firearm basics before they will issue you a License To Purchase, Carry, Possess, or Transport a handgun we are exempt from the 1000' rule.
Bronson
If you can call it a test...*chuckles*. I hate to have to agree with the Liberals/gun control people in saying the test to get a Permit to Purchase isn't much of a test.
I would like to know though, do you have any AGOs or other legalese references to support the opinion you stated?
United States v Tait (2000)
http://openjurist.org/202/f3d/1320/united-states-v-taitIn this case the person (Charged with school zone violation among other things)had a permit to possess a handgun issued in Michigan and Alabama. The court said the Michigan and Alabama permits counted as did his restoration of rights. It also may help OC in that the decision makes a reference to a background check not being needed and as long as Michigan issues a "license" to the person they are covered or that they satisfy Michigan law. As long as Michigan is okay with handgun possession then so are the Feds. Thoughts? I may be all wrong on this, but maybe not.
I have some highlights below.
The grand jury's second count against Tait charges him with a violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(q)(2)(A) (the "Gun-Free School Zone Act"). The section states, "It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. 922(q)(2)(A). Tait was on high school property, an obvious "school zone," at the time of his alleged criminal conduct. However, as with 922(g)(1), an exception to the firearms prohibition of 922(q)(2)(A) applies. Section 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) provides:
18
Subparagraph (A) does not apply to the possession of a firearm ... if the individual possessing the firearm is licensed to do so by the State in which the school zone is located or a political subdivision of the State, and the law of the State or political subdivision requires that, before an individual obtains such a license, the law enforcement authorities of the State or political subdivision verify that the individual is qualified under law to receive the license....19
18 U.S.C. 922(q)(2)(B)(ii).
20
The Gun-Free School Zone Act dictates that Tait violated federal law via possessing a handgun in a school zone unless Tait was licensed by Alabama, and either Alabama or Escambia County verified that Tait was qualified to receive the license.5 As Tait did possess a handgun in a school zone, and Tait was licensed in Alabama, the issue boils down to whether Alabama or Escambia County adequately verified that Tait was qualified to receive the license.
21
Alabama's licensing requirements are lenient:
22
The sheriff of a county may, upon application of any person residing in that county, issue a qualified or unlimited license to such person to carry a pistol ... if it appears that the applicant has good reason to fear injury to his person or property or has any other proper reason for carrying a pistol, and that he is a suitable person to be so licensed.
23
Ala.Code 13A-11-75 (1975). The government argues that Tait's license is void for purposes of 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) for two reasons: first, because Alabama's requirements for verifying an applicants' qualifications are too relaxed to ever qualify their licensees for 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) protections; and second, because Tait was not a suitable person to be licensed under Alabama law. According to the government, these licensing deficiencies resulted in Tait receiving a void license which did not qualify for the exception in 922(q)(2)(B)(ii).
24
The government first argues that Alabama licenses never qualify for the exception in 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) because Alabama does not require its licensing agents to conduct background checks on firearms license applicants. The 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) exception only applies if "... the law of the State ... requires that ... [the sheriff] verify that the individual is qualified under law to receive the license." 18 U.S.C. 922(q)(2)(B)(ii). By its basic terms, the statute merely requires that the Alabama sheriff ensured that Tait was qualified under Alabama law to receive the license. While the Alabama law is extremely lenient, it is nonetheless the only pertinent law. Alabama has chosen its laws, and these are the laws which determine whether the federal statute's exception applies. See Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 118 S.Ct. at 2011-12, 141 L.Ed.2d 303.6 Alabama is free to set forth its own licensing requirements, and Congress chose to defer to those licensing requirements when it established "qualified under law" as its criterion for the exception to the Gun-Free School Zone Act. Therefore the government's first argument with respect to 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) is rejected.7
25
The government next argues that Tait failed to qualify for an Alabama license, even under Alabama's lax standards, because Tait was not a suitable licensee. The government maintains that Tait was not suitable based on Alabama Code section 13A-11-72(a), which provides: "No person who has been convicted in this state or elsewhere of committing or attempting to commit a crime of violence shall own a pistol or have one in his ... possession or under his ... control." Ala.Code 13A-11-72(a) (1975). The government's argument fails due to a recent Eleventh Circuit opinion, United States v. Fowler, 11th Cir., 1999, 198 F.3d 808 (1999). The Fowler court held, "Without an express limitation on the certificate restoring civil and political rights ..., under Alabama law the restoration of civil and political rights restores the firearm rights limited by 13A-11-72(a)." Id.
26
The government tries to distinguish Fowler on two bases: first, that the defendant in Fowler received a written pardon restoring his civil rights (whereas Tait's civil rights were restored via operation of Michigan law); and second, that the Fowler case involved the interpretation of 922(g) rather than 922(q). Both distinctions are irrelevant. First, the Supreme Court held in Caron, "Massachusetts restored petitioner's civil rights by operation of law rather than by pardon or the like. This fact makes no difference." Caron, 524 U.S. 308, 118 S.Ct. at 2011, 141 L.Ed.2d 303. The critical issue is whether civil rights were restored unconditionally-not how the civil rights were restored. Tait's civil rights were restored, without reservation; thus Tait is entitled to the same protections as any other person without state-imposed limitations on his civil rights-including the protections of the 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) exception.
27
As for the government's second point, the fact that this court was evaluating 922(g) rather than 922(q) in Fowler is entirely irrelevant. Utilizing Fowler's line of reasoning, this court holds that Tait's firearms rights were restored for purposes of exceptions to 922(g) as well as 922(q). Fowler held that a felon's right to firearms was completely restored for purposes of removing 13A-11-72(a) limitations. Fowler, 198 F.3d 808. Tait's suitability for firearms licensing was equally restored. To hold otherwise would be non-congruous with Fowler. We therefore hold that the district court properly dismissed Count Two of the indictment against Tait.
